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1 Introduction
Classical statistical inferences have been criticised for various reasons. To assess
the soundness of such criticisms is a very important task because they are widely
used in everyday scientific research. This is one of the reasons why the philosophy
of statistics is an exciting field of study.
In this paper, I focus on two such criticisms. The first one claims that the use
of the p-value violates (or can violate) the principle of total evidence (PTE). It is
a thesis that has been defended by Elliott Sober and Bengt Autzen. The second
one says that the result of classical tests does not only depend on the data but on
the sampling plan of the experimenter also. The underlying criticism of course is
that the sampling plan is not part of the evidence and that classical tests therefore
violate PTE. The intentions of the experimenter should not affect the result of an
inference. See (Howson and Urbach 2006; Romeijn 2017).
My aim is to show that both criticisms are unsound. Doing so, I hope to clarify
the concept of p-value and the nature of the evidence in classical statistical tests.
More specifically, I show that the identification of the evidence on which those
criticisms rest is inadequate. By mischaracterising the evidence, we can wrongly
conclude that the principle of total evidence (however one wishes to spell that prin-
ciple out) is violated. We can save the frequentist approach from such arguments
by adequately describing the kind of information that is used in order to perform a
classical tests.
This paper contains three main sections. In the first section, I define its focus
and provide a basic explanation of frequentist tests with the help of an analogy.
In the second section, I dismiss Sober’s and Autzen’s views on PTE and p-values.
In order to make my point, I derive absurd conclusions by using the notion of ev-
idence on which they construct their criticisms. I shall propose a more adequate
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characterisation of evidence for frequentist tests that does not yeild absurd conclu-
sions.
In the final section, I rebut the criticism based on the sampling plan also known
as the ”stopping rule criticism”. I argue that the different conclusions that stem
from different stopping rules is explained by a difference in the evidence that has
been used. The intentions of the experimenter have nothing to do with it.
2 Frequentist Tests: An Intuitive Guide
Frequentist (or classical) statistics has many facets. It is a framework that allows
us to estimate parameters, evaluate the quality of those estimates, produce confi-
dence intervals and test hypotheses. In this paper however, I focus exclusively on
hypotheses testing. More specifically, I will focus on a general Neyman-Pearson
version of theory-testing, which I will define shortly. The way I define theory-
testing is taken quite literally from (Casella and Berger, 2002) Chapter 8.
Generally speaking, frequentist tests function a little bit like we would evaluate
an archer after several trials. First, we will establish a region near the center of the
target where most of A’s arrows should fall under the assumption that she is a good
archer. If most of her arrows do not fall within that region, then we shall no longer
think of her as a good archer. This kind of inference consists in making a prediction
as to where the arrow will fall under the supposition that A is a good archer and
a disposition to reject that assumption should A’s arrows mostly fall outside that
predicted region. The separation of the target into two regions is essential to the
inference because we cannot predict where most of the arrows will land exactly.
We can only predict the area where they will land.
Things are very similar with frequentist tests except that we do not test archers,
but values of (or constraints on) parameters and we do not observe arrows, but test
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statistics. However, much like in the archer scenario, we predetermine a region
where a test statistic will fall with a high probability under the assumption that a
hypothesis H is true. We shall reject that assumption H should the test statistic fall
outside that predicted region.
More precisely, we assume that a parameter θ (it could be a vector) of a prob-
ability distribution f (x; θ) is an element of a parameter space Θ. The hypothesis
that we wish to test specifies that θ is an element of some subset Θ0 of Θ. It is
true if θ ∈ Θ0 but false if θ /∈ Θ0. The hypothesis θ ∈ Θ0 is called ”the null
hypothesis” (H0) and its complement θ /∈ Θ0 is called ”the alternative hypothesis”
(H1).
The idea behind a Neyman-Pearson approach to hypothesis testing is to de-
termine a set C1 (a critical region) such that if x (or a function of x called a test
statistic) ∈ C1 then we will reject H0. If it does not belong to that set, we shall
not reject H0. The challenge is to find the critical region that makes an adequate
compromise between minimizing the probability of rejecting H0 when H0 is true
(the significance level of a test or the Type I error) and the probability of failing to
reject H0 when H1 is true (the Type II error).
Another concept that can be used within a Neyman-Pearson approach to hy-
pothesis testing is the concept of the p-value. The p-value is the smallest significant
level that would yield a rejection of H0 with a given test statistic. It can be seen as
an indicator that the test statistic belongs to the critical region when the p-value is
smaller or equal to the significance level of the test. 1
1Some believe that a smaller p-value means more evidence against H0. They also claim that a
p-value that is smaller than the significance level means that a belief in H0 is not tenable. Those
are proponents of the Fisher approach. See (Koopmans 1981, p.248) for a simple introduction on
Fisher’s version of frequentist hypothesis testing. In the following discussions I will defend the
Neyman-Pearson approach, but one could easily change the terminology that I will use in order to
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Just like in the example of the archer, we need to separate the space that the
statistic can occupy into two regions in order to be able to make a falsifiable pre-
diction. It is usually impossible to predict the exact value of the realisation of a
random variable. Just think of a probability density like the normal distribution.
The probability of every state is 0. It that case it is impossible to predict a single
state but only a range of states.
Notice here how there is an important distinction to be made between the prob-
ability of falling within a certain region and the probability of a particular test
statistic. The first one is needed to make an inference. The second one is relatively
uninformative by itself. Every possible test statistic can be very improbable. What
matters is whether or not it falls within a certain region under a given hypothesis.
This will determine the outcome of the inference.
Furthermore, notice how we do not define a probability density or mass on
the hypotheses that we are testing. We define probability densities or masses on
statistics. This means that our inferences will not attribute probabilities on the
hypothesis. For example, there is no such thing as the probability of H0 given the
test statistic within a frequentist framework. One might want to analyse frequentist
tests in those terms but this is a not a path I will attempt to follow in this paper.
Keeping this in mind, we are now ready to understand and define the evidence
used in such frequentist tests. The information that we need to use in order to reach
a conclusion in a classical context is quite rich. We need to identify a test statistic
and determined its correct distribution under H0. We also need to know how to
establish the correct regions on which to define the test. This requires a certain
knowledge of the alternative hypothesis H1. We also need to know where the test
defend Fisher’s approach. The main difference between the two methods is the interpretation of the
p-value and the formal treatment of the power of a test. The latter is absent in the Fisherian context.
See (Lehmann, 1993) for more information on the compatibility between both schools of thought.
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statistic lies in order to give a final verdict. This is all part of the evidence that
we need in order to make a sound frequentist inference. The p-value is simply an
indicator as to whether or not the test statistic has landed into the rejection region.
If we were to schematise this kind of frequentist inference we could say that
the conclusion is whether or not to reject H0. The premise is whether or not the
test statistic belongs to the critical region, and the background knowledge consists
of all the information necessary to establish the appropriate critical region. Both
the premise and the background knowledge are part of the evidence.
Of course, this kind of inference is not without shortcomings and there are
also other types of statistical inferences. For instance, there are likelihoodist and
Bayesian inferences. But in this paper I will not compare frequentist inferences
with other types of inferences. I only dismiss some arguments that aim to show
that frequentist inferences are internally problematic (without any comparison with
other types of inferences). Many philosophers have been dismissive of such infer-
ences and yet they misunderstand the basics.
For example, some have claimed that classical tests violate the principle of
total evidence (PTE). That principle has many different definitions in the literature.
Some give it a very general form such as ”one should use all evidence and only the
evidence when making an inference” (See (Neta 2008, p.90), others define it with
more details:
Suppose data d1 are strictly logically stronger than data d2, then an in-
ference about hypothesis H should be based on d1 if changing between
d1 and d2 changes the evidential assessment. (Autzen 2016, p.286).
I this paper, I do not take issue with PTE or with its numerous formulations.
I aim to dismiss arguments whose conclusions are that classical inferences violate
PTE based on a mistaken view of the evidence used in such tests. I will argue that
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we cannot equate the evidence with the data or with the probability of the data. By
doing so, we will wrongly conclude that frequentist tests (can) violate PTE, when
there is a viable description of the evidence that does not allow us to reach such a
conclusion.
Here are the three mistakes that I wish to pinpoint and dismiss:
• The aim of a classical test is to find out whether or not the observations are
sufficiently improbable under the null hypothesis.
• It is preferable to use tests such that the p-value is a sufficient statistic.
• The fact that different conclusions stem from different stopping rules is ex-
plained by a difference in the intentions of the experimenters.
3 The Principle of Total Evidence and P-values
In this section, I show how not to criticise frequentist inferences. I present a para-
dox and underscore the mistake from which it stems. This groundwork allows for
a fruitful assessment of Sober’s and Autzen’s critical appraisal of p-value based
inferences.
3.1 How not to Criticise Frequentist Inferences
Consider two one-sided frequentist tests as defined in Table 1 (See (Wagenmakers
2007, p.782) for a similar example).
Table 1: Two Mass Functions Under H0
distrbution x=1 x=2 x=3 x=4 x=5
f(x|H0) 0.5 0.46 0.03 0.006 0.004
g(x|H0) 0.5 0.44 0.03 0.02 0.01
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The first test involves the mass function f (x) under the assumption that a null
hypothesis H0 is true, the observed outcome x=3, and a p-value of 0.04. The
second test involves the mass function g(x) under the assumption that a H0 is true,
the observed outcome x=3, and a p-value of 0.06. Assuming that the significance
level for both tests is 0.05, then we will reject H0 in the first case, but not in the
second.
Now this looks paradoxical. Surely, if the probability of x=3 is not low enough
to reject H0 when we conduct the second test, then it should not be low enough to
reject H0 when we do the first one. After all, that probability under H0 is the same
for both tests. Yet, we claim to have evidence against H0 in the first case but not in
the second. It certainly looks as if the frequentist approach to testing hypotheses is
incoherent.
This kind of paradox, however, rests on the incorrect assumption that the evi-
dence is the same in both scenarios because the probability of the observation under
H0 is the same in both. To understand why this is a mistake, we must analyse both
inferences more meticulously.
In order to make an inference concerning H0 in both cases, we must first be
able to predict a precise and probable range of possible outcomes for a very small
probability of error under H0. This allows us to make falsifiable predictions under
the assumption that H0 is true.
For the first test, the most precise and probable range of possible outcomes for
an upper bound probability of error of 0.05 under H0 can only be x=1 and x=2.
When our observation falls outside that range (when it falls inside the so-called
critical region), then we reject H0 and we can claim to have evidence that the
distribution is inadequately described under H0. That is why we end up rejecting
H0 in the first test.
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For the second test, the most precise and probable range of possible outcomes
for an upper bound probability of error of 0.05 under H0 is x=1, x=2, and x=3.
That is why we cannot claim to have evidence against H0 even if the probability of
x=3 is also 0.03.
As we can see the evidence is very different in both scenarios. In one case
we observe that the outcome of the experiment does not belong to the range of
predicted outcomes, whereas it belongs to it in the second case. This is so, even if
the probability of the observation is the same under both null hypotheses.
Of course, this difference between the two tests should not come as a surprise
because the distributions are different in both cases. Our predictions cannot always
be the same when we consider different distributions. That would be absurd.
The take away lesson here is to realise that the premise on which we rely in
order to make a frequentist inference in this case is whether or not our observation
falls within the most precise and probable range of possible outcomes for a small
upper bound probability of error under H0. This is exactly the information that a
p-value gives us and that is why it is such a central concept within the frequentist
approach.
If we claim that the evidence of a frequentist test is the probability of the test
statistic under H0, then we can derive absurd conclusions such as ”the evidence is
the same when we conduct test 1 and test 2, yet we reject H0 in one test but not
the other”. As I have shows, we can make sense of frequentist tests without falling
into that trap. Unfortunately, we can still find criticisms of the frequentist approach
that rest on the idea that the evidence for a frequentist test is the probability of the
test statistic under H0, such as Elliot Sober’s criticism of the p-value.
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3.2 Sober on the P-value and the principle of Total Evidence
Sober’s relatively recent criticism of the p-value can be presented in two simple
steps. The first step consists in saying that the frequentist approach to theory testing
(FA) dictates that we should reject the hypothesis that we are testing (or claim
that we have evidence against it) if our observations are too improbable under that
hypothesis.
[A significance] test has the additional defect that it violates the prin-
ciple of total evidence. In a significance test, the hypothesis you are
testing is called the null hypothesis, and your question is whether the
observations are sufficiently improbable according to the null hypoth-
esis (Sober 2008, p.53, emphasis added).
The second step consists in pointing out that the p-value is not reporting the
probability of the observations under the null-hypothesis, but the probability of
obtaining a result within a certain region.
However, you don’t consider the observations in all their detail but
rather the fact that they fall in a certain region. You use a logically
weaker rather than a logically stronger description of the data. Here’s
an example [...] that illustrates the point. You want to test the hypoth-
esis that a coin is fair [...] by tossing the coin twenty times. Assume
that the tosses are independent of each other. Suppose you obtain four
heads. You then compute the probability of a disjunction in which
”four heads” is one of the disjuncts.[...] The probability of this dis-
junction, conditional on the null hypothesis, is called the p-value for
the test outcome (Sober 2008, p.53-54).
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Therefore, we are not using all the information that is provided by the data
when we use the p-value in order to make an inference about H0. Hence, frequen-
tist inferences violate the principal of total evidence.
The problem with this argument obviously lies in the first step. The frequentist
theory of statistical inference does not imply that we should reject the hypothesis
that we are testing (or that we have evidence against it) if our observations are
too improbable under that hypothesis. This is a misconception at the root of the
paradox that I have presented in the first section.
The fact is that no matter how you define ”improbable” (≤ 0.05, ≤ 0.001,
or ≤ 0.0001), we can always construct a probability distribution such that every
possible experimental result will be even less probable. It would thus be absurd
to suggest that such distributions are inadequate given that our observations are al-
ways improbable under such distributions. If that kind of inference was sanctioned
by FA, then we would have to reject (or claim that we have evidence against) every
possible density function since the probability of an observation under any density
function is 0. This is preposterous.
To make a frequentist inference adequately, we must first be able to make a
prediction with the probability distribution that we are testing. As I said before, we
usually cannot predict any particular observations because each of them can be very
improbable (their probability is actually 0 if we are dealing with a density). But
what we can always do with a probability distribution is to establish a likely and
an unlikely range of observations according to a predefined degree of probability
that we judge to be ”too improbable”. This will allow us to make a prediction as to
where our observations will lie.
For example, suppose that we do not have any knowledge about the nature of
the alternative hypothesis and that we agree that 0.0027 is improbable. Then we can
predict that an instantiation of random variable that follows a normal distribution
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will lie within 3 standard deviations from the mean of a normal distribution 99.73%
of the time. Therefore, if our actual observation lies outside that range, then we
have evidence that the probability distribution that we are testing does not correctly
describe the random variable that we are studying.
The idea that we have to be able to make predictions with the hypothesis that
we are testing is at the heart of FA. By itself, the magnitude of the probability of
the observations is totally meaningless in that context. It is simply not a sufficient
piece of evidence for a frequentist inference. Only the probability of falling within
a certain range of possible values is important. This is because it is the only type
of prediction that we can always make with every possible probability distribution.
Therefore, it is false to suggest that the probability of the observations that we
make under the hypothesis that we are testing is a logically stronger description
of the evidence than the p-value. The p-value determines if our test statistic (our
observations) lies within the unlikely range of possible observations that we can
make. That is what we need in order to make an inference and that is all we need
to make that inference.
Hence, we can conclude that Sober’s criticism is unsound. It rests on the mis-
taken idea that the probability of the observations that we make is (or should be)
sufficient evidence when we are making a frequentist statistical test. It is not. We
can make better sense of frequentist tests when we dismiss that idea.
3.3 Autzen on the p-value and the principle of total evidence
Having thus put aside one of Sober’s criticism of the p-value and clarified the nature
of classical inferences in statistics, I believe it is also important to correct another
mistake about frequentist tests and the nature of the p-value. The latter appears in
Autzen’s critical assessment of the p-value.
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Recall Autzen’s definition of PTE:
Suppose data d1 are strictly logically stronger than data d2, then an in-
ference about hypothesis H should be based on d1 if changing between
d1 and d2 changes the evidential assessment. (Autzen 2016, p.286).
Already we can see the mistake: Autzen equates evidence with data. In fact,
Autzen claims that a p-value obtained by performing a one-sided test respects PTE
because it is a sufficient statistic. In other words, he believes that there is no other
logically stronger evidence d1 than a sufficient statistic such that an inference about
H based on d1 would change the evidential assessment.
This is not the case for a p-value obtained with a two-sided test. The p-value is
not a sufficient statistics in a two-sided test. Therefore, we must prefer a one-sided
test in order to comply with PTE. 2
Summing up, I have established a one-to-one function between the
value of the sufficient statistic X¯ and the p-value. This implies that the
one-sided p-value constitutes a sufficient statistic for the mean of the
normal distribution. While Sober (2008, 45) stresses the importance of
sufficiency in the context of PTE, he does not mention that for a large
class of significance tests the p-value constitutes a sufficient statistic.
[...] I conclude that [the p-value] does not violate [PTE] (Autzen 2016,
p.289).
But this is false. Inferences based on a two-sided test are not epistemically
subpar. In fact, they can be preferable to one-sided tests. We can fail to have
enough knowledge in order to use a one-sided test such that a two-sided test and a
p-value that is not a sufficient statistic will provide the best inference.
2A sufficient statistic is a function of the observed sample such that the distribution of the sample
is independent of the unknown parameter(s) of the distribution given that particular statistic.
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Here is a simple example. Suppose that we have a sample of independent
and identically distributed variables (X1,X2, ...,Xn). They all follow a normal
distribution with a variance equal to 1 and an unknown mean θ. Suppose also that
we wish to test whether or not θ = 1. This is our null-hypothesis H0. We decide
to use X¯ as our test statistic (it is sufficient).
Suppose further that we do not know anything about the alternative hypothesis
except that it is incompatible with H0. The real θ could be greater or less than
1. Yet, we decide to perform a one-sided test as if we knew that the real θ was
greater than or equal to 1. Now let’s assume that we obtain X¯ = 0.001. Naturally
we will fail to reject H0. We will not consider that we have evidence against
H0 because we have conducted our test as if we knew that H1: θ < 1 is not
a genuine alternative. But we do not have such knowledge. As such we have
made an inadequate inference. We acted as if we had more evidence than what we
actually have even if we used a sufficient statistic.
The point is that our knowledge (or lack of knowledge) about the alternative
hypothesis is an integral part of the evidence as we make a frequentist test. This is
because it allows us to determine a likely range of possible outcomes under H0 that
we can predict for a small probabiliy of error. Look back at the archer’s analogy.
We need to have an idea of what a good and a bad archer would do in order to
identify the relevant regions on the target.
The only way we can make an adequate inference in this case is to conduct
a two-sided test and reject H0. Unfortunately, our knowledge about the alterna-
tive hypothesis is not considered as evidence by Autzen. As soon as we consider
adequately the evidence used in a frequentist test, we realise the importance of
two-sided tests.
Autzen misrepresents the epistemological foundations of a frequentist test and
fails to recognise the importance of two-sided tests when he claims that ”using
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one-sided tests with a sufficient test statistic is in accordance with PTE” (Autzen
2016, p.292) and that ”this supports the view of choosing a one-sided test over
a two-sided test”(Autzen 2016, p.292). Two-sided tests are not only used in a
wide variety of contexts (just think of the tests being made on the parameters of a
regression model), but they are also essential to make sound inferences.
In sum, Autzen’s criticism of the p-value and of two-sided tests must be re-
jected because it fails to adequately define the evidence that is used when we per-
form a frequentist test. The evidence is never a sufficient statistic by itself.
The crucial piece of information that we are looking for is whether or not our
test statistic lies within a predicted range of possible outcomes. This piece of evi-
dence rests on our knowledge (or lack of knowledge) of the alternative hypothesis.
In other words, Autzen’s mistake does not lie with his formulation of PTE, but with
the notion of evidence.
Over all, both Sober’s and Autzen’s criticisms do not provide good reasons to
believe that the p-value violates PTE. The reason for this does not reside in their
definition of PTE. In the case of Sober’s criticism, I have shown that the probability
of the test statistic is not and should not be the information on which we rely in
order to make a classical test. In the case of Autzen’s criticism, I have shown why
we should not always use sufficient statistics when we perform a classical test.
4 The Principle of Total Evidence and the Stopping Rule
In this section, I discuss a similar problem in the sense that it implies the result of
classical tests depends on information that should not be a part of the evidence. If
we define PTE in such a way that we prescribe that one should use all the evidence
and only the evidence, then it is another way of saying that classical inferences
violate PTE. It is a criticism that we can find in many publications. The interested
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reader can consult (Howson and Urbach 2006; Romeijn 2017; Wagenmakers 2007;
Kadane et al. 1996; Mayo 1996; Robbins 1985; Roberts 1967) for examples.
The structure of this criticism is always the same. Choose two different ex-
periments that yield the exact same observations and where the same parameter is
under test. Both experiments will yield different sufficient test statistics such that
one produces a significant result but not the other. Since the difference between
the two experiments is not the evidence but the experimental set up, which is de-
termined by the personal preferences of the experimenter, then we must conclude
that classical inferences do not totally rest on evidence.
Here is how Colin Howson and Peter Urbach put it:
We suggest that such information about experimenters’ subjective in-
tentions, their physical strengths and their personal qualities has no
inductive relevance whatever in this context, and that in practice it is
never sought or even contemplated (Howson and Urbach 2006, p.158).
To understand where this is coming from, consider the following experiments.
Both aim at testing whether or not a coin is fair, i.e., whether the probability of
landing head is 0.5 or greater. In other words, the parameters that are being tested
are the same under both experiments.
In the first experiment, statistician S decides that he will throw the coin six
times and record how many heads he obtains. He obtains five heads in a row and
then a tail. The fact that S obtained five heads in 6 trial is a statistic that follows
a binomial distribution and under the assumption that the probability of success is
0.5 (H0), S cannot reject H0 with a significance level of 0.05 because the p-value
is 0.109.
In the second experiment, statistician S* decides that he shall throw the coin
six times at most until he obtains a tail. His observations are exactly the same as
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S but the test statistic this time follows a geometric distribution such that the p-
value is 0.016. Thus, S* can reject H0 with a significance level of 0.05. How is
this possible? The observations are the same and if the only difference between
the two scenarios is how the experimenters subjectively decided to conduct their
experiments (choose their sampling plan), then something is seriously wrong with
this kind of inference.
Of course, the difference between the sampling plan is not the only difference
between the two scenarios. The fact is that both experiments generated two dif-
ferent sufficient test statistics and both S and S* were in a position to realise this.
Both knew about the order of the sequence of heads and tails and both knew about
the number of heads and tails.
Unfortunately, both S and S* arbitrarily chose one over the other in order to
make their respective inference. They both neglected crucial information con-
cerning the different observations generated by the experiment and their respective
probability distribution.
When we are in a position to realise multiple tests in order to make an infer-
ence, we cannot simply choose one of those tests without any reason. That would
be tantamount to making an arbitrary inference based on arbitrary evidence and
I believe that an epistemic principle such as PTE has been invoked in the philo-
sophical literature in order to rule out such arbitrariness from adequate epistemic
practices. In other words, the kind of example mentioned above does not show that
classical tests are defective, they stress the importance of an epistemic principle
such as PTE.
Now, which of the two inferences mentioned above is the best is a question that
we can only answer with a confirmation theory. By determining which inference
provides the most justified conclusion, one can settle on one test over the other.
One such theory that is prevalent in the philosophical literature and that applies
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to frequentist test is the severity measure which asserts that data x0 provide good
evidence for hypothesis H to the extent that test T has severely passed H with x0
(Mayo and Spanos 2010). Given all the information available in order to make
frequentist tests one can then determine which is the best one with a measure of
support such as the severity measure. But a full analyses of such theories is beyond
the scope of this paper.
In sum, the stopping rule criticism is unsound since the different results in-
volved in that argument can be explained by the fact that both experimenters do
not consider all the evidence that should be used to make an adequate inference.
In every variation of this criticism there is always an experimenter that ignores the
fact that her experiment generated more than one test statistic, i.e., that ignores part
of the evidence.
Generally speaking, we can control the power (the probability of rejecting H0
when H1 is true) of a test by making more or less observations. That is why it
can be important to stop sampling new observations at some point. We can stop
sampling new observations because we have already reached the desired power for
a given test or because we do not wish to have too much power. After all, high
powered tests can detect uninteresting differences. The bottom line is that anyone
who cares about error control must care about the stopping rule. It is far from being
an inductively irrelevant rule.
5 Conclusion
The p-value is an essential component of every frequentist inference. In this paper,
I have focused on a common criticism of this concept. It is meant to show that its
use violates (or can violate) the principle of total evidence. This claim has been
made by Sober and Autzen.
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Both versions of this criticism rest on a notion of evidence that leads to absurd
conclusions. Sober’s criticism assumes that the evidence used in a frequentist test
is the probability of the test statistic under H0. This is false and it is at the root of
the paradox presented in the first section.
Autzen’s criticism assumes that the evidence used in a frequentist test should
be a sufficient statistic. I have shown that we would make awful inferences if this
was a requirement. No competent statistician would make such mistakes. Under
minimal information about the alternative hypothesis, we need to use a two-sided
test and thus a p-value that is not a sufficient statistic.
The purpose of a frequentist inference is to be able to make a falsifiable predic-
tion by defining a critical region. In order to define such a critical region, we need
to rely on our knowledge (or lack of knowledge) about the alternative hypothesis.
Ultimately, the p-value informs us about whether or not our observation fell into
the critical region.
Once we make those steps clear, both Sober and Autzen’s criticisms can be
dismissed. The crucial point to remember is that a density or a mass function
usually only allows us to predict ranges of possible outcome, as opposed to one
single outcome. Therefore, any criticism of a frequentist inference that defines the
evidence without any reference to a range of outcomes to which the observation
belongs misses the point completely.
In the last part of this paper, I have also debunked the stopping rule criticism,
which also implies that frequentist inferences fail PTE. It claims to show that two
experimenters can arrive at different conclusions with the same evidence. That
criticism is unsound because in all of its variations there is always an experimenter
that ignores a test statistic that has been generated by the experiment, i.e., that
ignores part of the evidence.
In this article, I do not say much about PTE. But what I need to say about it
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is important nonetheless. However you wish to define that principle, when you
evaluate classical inferences in function of that principle, make sure that you do
not claim that the evidence is the test statistic or its probability under H0. Such
definitions lead to absurd conclusions. The evidence is also the knowledge of the
critical region and whether or not the test statistic belongs to that region.
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